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NOTES
Administrative Law-Natural Gas Regulation: FERC Must
Consider Actuall Impact of Curtailment Plans
Since the beginning of the current shortage of natural gas,' the
Federal Power Commission (FPC and now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC))2 has regulated not only the price of natural
gas sold in interstate commerce, but also the allocation of scarce supplies of interstate gas.3 The Commission has not allocated interstate
1. See M. WILLRICH,

ADMINISTRATION OF ENERGY SHORTAGES

11-14 (1976) for a statisti-

cal description of the shortage. For a discussion of the causes of the shortage, see Harrison &
Formby, Regional Distortions in Natural Gas Allocations: 4 Legal and Economic Anaysis, 57
N.C.L. REv. 57 (1978). In the last year or so, however, the shortage has abated somewhat, as
industrial users have switched to other fuels, and as additions to reserves, prompted by higher
prices for new discoveries, have increased. Berry, Whatever Happenedto that Shortage of Natural
Gas?,FORBES, Sept. 4, 1978, at 32. Gas is still less plentiful on the interstate market than on the
intrastate market though, since most of the new gas was intended for the intrastate markets in
which prices are not controlled. Id. at 33.
2. The Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977), transferred most of the Federal Power Commission's duties in administering the Natural Gas Act to
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
3. A brief description of the structure and operation of the natural gas industry is helpful.
The process by which natural gas comes from the ground to the consumer's burner tip is divided
into three stages: production, transmission, and local distribution. Producers in the fields sell gas
to pipelines according to long-term contracts. Interstate pipelines then transmit the gas to various
parts of the country and sell most of it to local distributors, who, in turn, deliver and sell the gas to
ultimate consumers. See Harrison & Formby, supra note 1, at 59-62. About 10% of interstate
pipeline sales, however, are made directly from pipelines to ultimate industrial consumers. M.
WILLRICH, supranote 1, at 19. Depending on "the density of population and the industrial structure of regional economies," some areas are served by two or more pipelines, while others are
entirely dependent on a single pipeline. Harrison & Formby, supra, at 60.
The scope of the Commission's jurisdiction over the natural gas industry is defined by § 1(b)
of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976):
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in
interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to
natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any
other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to
the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.
Id. § 1(c), 15 U.S.C. § 717(c), expressly limiting the Commission's jurisdiction, provides in

part:
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person engaged in or legally
authorized to engage in the transportation in interstate commerce or the sale in interstate
commerce for resale, of natural gas received by such person from another person within
or at the boundary of a State if all the natural gas so received is ultimately consumed
within such State, or to any facilities used by such person for such transportation or sale,
provided that the rates and service of such person and facilities be subject to regulation
by a State commission. The matters exempted from the provisions of this Chapter by
this subsection are declared to be matters piimarily of local concern and subject to regulation by the several States.
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gas on a nationwide basis, but has chosen instead to treat each inter-

state pipeline as a separate unit,4 and to regulate the distribution of
each pipeline's supplies through the use of "curtailment plans"5 filed by
the pipeline and approved by the FPC. Since 1973, the Commission
has followed a policy of favoring "end-use" curtailment plans, which
allocate each pipeline's supplies according to priorities based on the
ultimate or end use to which the gas is put.6 The implementation of
The FPC's regulation of natural gas allocation was begun by Order No. 431, 45 F.P.C. 570
(1971), entitled "Policy with Respect to Establishment of Measures to Be Taken for the Protection
of as Reliable and Adequate Service as Present Natural Gas Supplies and Capacities Will
Permit."
4. Harrison & Formby, supra note 1, at 82.
5. A "curtailment plan" is a scheme for allocating a pipeline's supply of natural gas during
times of shortage. Despite the prospect of increased supplies presented by recently enacted legislation that "deregulates" prices of newly discovered natural gas, shortages, and the accompanying
need for curtailment plans, are not likely to disappear altogether.
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350, printedin [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws No. 12, passed by the Senate on September 27, 1978, 124 CONG. REc.
S16,265 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978), and by the House on October 14, 1978, 124 CONG. REc.
H13,427 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978), will no doubt increase the supply of natural gas available to the
interstate market. Prior to the 1978 Act the price of gas sold for ultimate use in the same state
where it was produced (intrastate gas) was not subject to federal regulation, as is the price of gas
produced for use in other states (interstate gas). See Natural Gas Act, § 1(b), (c), 15 U.S.C. §
717(b), (c) (1976); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954) (upholding Commission's authority to regulate wellhead prices of gas intended for sale in interstate commerce). Accordingly, producers were reluctant to invest the large sums of money necessary to develop new,
more expensive, sources of gas, and the new gas that was produced was sold in the intrastate
market. Moring & Wilderotter, NaturalGas: The Policy-PricingMatrix, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INsT. 737, 748 (1977). The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, however, extends federal price regulation to intrastate gas, and then gradually eliminates price controls on newly discovered gas, both
intrastate and interstate, allowing full price deregulation in 1985. 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
2615-16 (1978). The prospect of higher prices for producers should encourage exploitation of new,
less easily tapped sources of gas.
Just how much additional gas production the new legislation will induce remains to be seen.
Estimates by the administration and independent analysts vary widely. Hunt, Senate Approves
NaturalGas Bill, 57-42, to RescindNew-Find Controlsby '85, Regulate IntrastatePrices,Wall St.
J., Sept. 28, 1978, at 2, coL 2. The burdensome complexity of the new bill's regulatory scheme
may discourage some producers from attempting to find new gas. Sheils, Will the Gas BillHep?,
NEwsWEEK, Oct. 2, 1978, at 103. In any event, full deregulation of the prices of most newly
discovered gas will not come until 1985. In the interim, supplies may remain sufficiently low to
require curtailment. That the bill's authors foresaw the possibility of continued shortages is indicated by the Act's provision in title III for special presidential authority during natural gas emergencies, and in title IV for the establishment of certain curtailment priorities. See note 92 infra.
6. See North Carolina v. FERC, 584 F.2d 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Theoretically, as the
pipeline's supply decreases, service to successively higher-priority uses is curtailed. Id. Curtailment into a given priority category does not begin until service to all lower categories has been
completely curtailed. Id. at 1008.
The Commission's ability to ensure that curtailment of service to ultimate users actually proceeds in conformity with the priorities set forth in an end-use plan, however, is significantly circumscribed by the limitations on the Commission's jurisdiction. Since its jurisdiction extends only
to the sale and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, see 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976),
quotedin note 3 supra, the Commission has no authority to regulate the allocation of gas by local
distributors to ultimate or end users. M. WELLRICH, supra note I, at 46-47. Instead, the Commis-
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end-use curtailment plans on a strictly pipeline-by-pipeline basis has
caused much more severe curtailment in some regions (most notably
the Southeast, and North Carolina and South Carolina in particular)
than in others.7 In North Carolina v. FERC, however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit determined that two major features of an end-use curtailment plan were defective because they tended to result in regionally discriminatory
allocation and because they rendered an accurate assessment of the
plan's actual impact impossible.9 The court held that in drawing the
curtailment plans the Commission must determine and consider the actual impact of the plans on ultimate consumers. 10 To assess a plan's
actual impact, the Commission must collect and consider information
about recent changes in the end uses to which gas supplied to the pipeline's customers" is put by ultimate consumers 12 and in the relative
supplies available to each customer from other pipelines.1 3 This decision may mean that in the future, supplies of natural gas will be more
sion's curtailment plans control only the allocation of gas from interstate pipelines to their immediate customers-either local distributors or industrial users who purchase directly from the
pipeline. Id. Except in the case of directly purchasing end users, then, the "end-use" character of
an end-use curtailment plan lies not in the actual control of the use of gas at the burner tip, but in
the allocation of the pipeline's supply to local distributors according to each distributor's "end-use
profile" or "mix" of end uses to which gas purchased by the distributor's customers was put during
some base period. See 584 F.2d at 1007. There is no guarantee, however, that the state agencies
that regulate local distribution will follow the priorities set forth in a curtailment plan ordered into
effect by the Commission. M. WILLRICH, supra, at 46-47.
A "pro rata," in contrast to end-use, curtailment plan, allocates the pipeline's supply according to the contractual entitlements of each of the pipeline's customers. 584 F.2d at 1007. The
amount of gas for which each customer has contracted is reduced by the same percentage as that
by which the supplies of the entire pipeline system have been reduced.
The Commission announced its preference for end-use curtailment plans in Order No. 467,
38 Fed. Reg. 1503 (1973) (partially codified as amended at 18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1977)). For a discussion of the order, see notes 34-36 and accompanying tdxt infra.
7. Harrison & Formby, supra note 1, at 85-86.
8. 584 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
9. Id. at 1012-14, 1014 n.22; North Carolina v. FERC, No. 76-2102 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29,
1978) (order amending opinion of July 13, 1978, by adding footnote 20). The court's order of Aug.
29, 1978, amended North Carolina v. FERC, No. 76-2102 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 1978) by ordering
the addition of new footnote 20 on page 21 of the slip opinion and renumbering old footnotes 2034 as 21-35. The slip opinion was reprinted in 584 F.2d at 1003 prior to this renumbering. In this
Note citations to North Carolinav. FERC notes 20-34 reprinted in 584 F.2d are to the notes as
designated before renumbering. New note 20 is hereinafter cited as Slip op. at 21 n.20 (as
amended Aug. 29, 1978).
10. 584 F.2d at 1015.
11. Throughout this Note, the term "customer," unless otherwise indicated, is intended to
refer either to local distributors or to industrial end-users who purchase their gas directly from an
interstate pipeline.
12. Slip op. at 21 n.20 (as amended Aug. 29, 1978).
13. 584 F.2d at 1013-15.
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evenly allocated among the various regions of the country than at present. Nevertheless, regional distortions are likely to remain.
North Carolina v. FERC arose when certain customers of Transcontinental Pipe Line Corporation (Transco)14 sought judicial review
of a permanent curtailment plan for the Transco system ordered into
effect by FPC Opinion No. 778.15 Opinion 778 established nine priority categories of end use, ranging from residential and small commercial use (first in priority and last to be curtailed) to use of large amounts
of gas as boiler fuel (last in priority and first to be curtailed). 16 The
14. Transco buys natural gas from producers in the Gulf states and transmits it by pipeline to
customers in Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. All but one of Transco's customers "are wholesale customers-public utilities and municipalities which purchase the gas for resale to ultimate customers."
Id. at 1008. As a company engaged in the transportation and sale for resale of gas in interstate
commerce, Transco is subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under § l(b) of the Natural
Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976), quoted in note 3 SUpra.
15. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., Opinion No. 778, 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) 51045 (1976). Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., Opinion No. 778-A, 11 FED. POWER SERV.
(M-B) 5-177 (1976), made only slight modifications to Opinion No. 778.
The proceedings leading to Opinion 778 began in 1971 when, in response to growing
shortages and to FPC Order No. 431, 45 F.P.C. 570 (1971), Transco filed a permanent curtailment
plan with the FPC. 584 F.2d at 1009. Following the Commission's direction, Transco filed another permanent plan in 1973 that was consistent with the end-use guideline set forth in FPC
Order No. 467, 49 F.P.C. 85 (1973). 584 F.2d at 1009. Final decision on a permanent plan was
delayed for several years, however. During the intervening period the short supplies of Transco's
system were distributed according to a series of interim settlement agreements arrived at by negotiation among Transco and its customers, and either approved by the FPC or ordered into effect
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id at 1008. The first two interim
settlement agreements were based on pro rata curtailment, the third on 50% pro rata and 50% enduse curtailment, and the fourth and final on an end-use plan with two priority categories. Id. at
1008-09.
16. The priority categories set forth in Opinion 778 are:
(1) Residential and small commercial requirements less than 50 Mcf on a peak day.
(2) Large commercial requirements of 50 Mcf or more on a peak day, except for commercial boiler fuel requirements above 300 Mcf/d; industrial requirement for plant protection, feedstock and process needs; and storage injection requirements.
(3) All other industrial requirements below 300 Mcf/d.
(4) Industrial requirements not specified in (2) (6) (7) (8) and (9) of more than 300
Mcf/d but less than 3000 Mcf/d.
(5) Industrial requirements not specified in (2) (6) (7) (8) and (9) of more than 3000
Mcf/d.
(6) Boiler fuel requirements of more than 300 Mcf/d but less than 1500 Mcf/d.
(7) Boiler fuel requirements of 1500 Mcf/d or more but less than 3000 Mcf/d.
(8) Boiler fuel requirements of 3000 Mcf/d or more but less than 10,000 Mcf/d.
(9) Boiler fuel requirements of 10,000 Mcf/d or more.
10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1091 n.63. "Mcf/d" means one thousand cubic feet per day.
Opinion 778 defined "process," "feedstock," and "plant protection" as follows:
Process refers to those industrial uses for which alternate fuels are not technically feasible. In general, this means those uses requiring the precise temperature controls and
flame characteristics of gas (including propane and other gaseous fuels). Feedstock refers to the industrial use of gas as a raw material, that is, for its chemical not thermal,
properties. Plant protection refers to the industrial use of gas needed to prevent physical
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amount of gas available to each resale distributor is determined by the
"end-use profile" or "mix" of end uses to which gas purchased by the
distributor's customers is put. 7 This proffle is, however, not derived
from current uses, but rather from customer uses during the "base period," May 1, 1972, through April 30, 1973.18 According to the plan,
Transco customers who are served by one or more other pipelines are

allocated an amount of gas for each of their priority uses that is proportionately equal to the amount of gas supplied to them by Transco out of

their total supply during the base period.19 In other words, if local distributor Company A received 40% of its total supply from Transco and
60% from another pipeline during 1972-1973, 40% of each of Company
A's priorities would be assigned to Transco. z' Thus, if at some point in
the future the available supply on the Transco system were sufficient to

allow service to only the first three priorities, Company A would be
entitled to receive from Transco 40% of its requirements for those three
priorities.2 '
The primary issue before the court of appeals in North Carolinav.
FERC was whether the plan ordered into effect by Opinion 778 resulted in undue or unreasonable discrimination against certain localities or classes of service, thereby violating section 4(b) of the Natural
harm to plant facilities and/or danger to plant personnel, but it is limited to protection
which cannot be attained through the use of alternate fuels (again propane and other
gaseous fuels are not considered alternate fuels).
Id. at 5-1084. Use of gas for "boiler fuel" "[is] considered to be natural gas used as a fuel for the
generation of steam or electricity, including utilization of gas turbines for the generation of electricity." 18 C.F.IR § 2.78 (1977).
17. 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1067. The court in North Carolina v. FERCexplained
this feature of an end-use plan as follows:
mhe extent to which a pipeline's distributor customers are curtailed depends on the
"mix" of each distributor's own customers. Distributors who have a large percentage of
high priority customers theoretically will not be curtailed as deeply as those who have a
small percentage ofsuch customers, and distributors who have a large percentage of low
priority customers will be curtailed more sharply than those who have a small percentage
of such customers.
584 F.2d at 1007.
18. 10 FED. POwER SERv. (M-B) at 5-1067.
19. See 584 F.2d at 1010, 1013-14.
20. See id.
21. Two additional elements of Opinion 778 should be noted. First, the Commission refused
to consider the merits of a provision by which those customers curtailed less than the average level
of curtailment for the Transco system would pay monetary compensation to those customers curtailed more than the average level. 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1073, 5-1103. The Commission maintained that it had no authority to enforce such a provision. Id. at 5-1103; see 584 F.2d at
1015-16. Second, Opinion 778 included an "emergency high priority exemption from curtailment," available to distributors under certain conditions. 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1093
to 94.
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Gas Act.22 Since the record demonstrated that the plan wrought regionally discriminatory results, 23 the legality of Opinion 778 depended
on whether there was sufficient justification for those results.24 Declaring that the "discrimination resulting from an end-use plan can be justified only to the extent that the plan actually doesprotect high-priority
usesfrom curtailmentaheadoflow-priority uses," the court held that the

plan adopted in Opinion 778 could not be said to be just and reasonable, "in light of the Commission'sfailureto makefindings as to the impact theplan would actualy have on ultimate consumers. '2 5 According

to the court, two features of the plan precluded an accurate assessment
of the plan's impact: first, the end-use data on which the plan was based
was approximately six years old, 6 and second, the plan failed to take
into account the "partial/full requirements phenomenon ' ' 27 a situa-

tion resulting from the fact that some of Transco's customers ("partialrequirements customers") are served by one or more additional pipelines that have experienced considerably less severe shortages than
Transco in the years since the 1972-1973 base period, while those cus-

tomers ("full-requirements customers") supplied exclusively by
Transco have borne the full weight of the Transco system's deep
curtailment.28
22. 584 F.2d at 1010-12. Section 4(b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(b)(1976)
provides:
No natural-gas company shall, with respect to any transportation or sale of natural
gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or grant any undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, facilities,
or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes of service.
23. The court stated:
A study showed that if an Opinion 778-type plan had been implemented in 1974-1975 it
would have resulted in levels of curtailment among Transco's distributors ranging from
9.6% to 39.5% on a state-by-state basis ... . On a regional basis, curtailment levels
would have ranged from 20.3% in the Northeast [District of Columbia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York] to 38.4% in the Southeast [South Carolina,
North Carolina, Virginia]....
584 F.2d at 1011 (footnote omitted).
In the 1976-1977 heating season, during which the Opinion 778 plan was in effect on the
Transco system, regional distortions were pronounced. Curtailment of total natural gas requirements was at the level of 66.9% in South Carolina and 52.9% in North Carolina, while the corresponding figures for New York and Pennsylvania were 9.5% and 11.9%. Harrison & Formby,
su.pra note 1, at 84.
24. 584 F.2d at 1012.
25. Id. (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 1012-13.
27. Id. at 1013-14, 1014 n.22.
28. The court did not vacate Opinion 778. Instead, it allowed the Opinion 778 plan to remain in effect on a temporary basis until the Commission has had a reasonable time to consider
the issues remanded to it by the court of appeals. Id. at 1017.
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Development of the FPC's policies of curtailment began in 1971
with the promulgation of Order No. 43 1,2 9 directing pipelines expecting

shortages during the upcoming winter to submit curtailment plans to
the Commission. Judicial approval of the FPC's authority to regulate
curtailment by interstate pipelines came soon thereafter in FPCv. Louisiana Power & Light Co. ,30 in which the Supreme Court held that the

Commission's power over curtailment derives from its jurisdiction over
the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce.3 1 The Court
went on to say that the Commission must have broad powers over cur-

tailment programs in order to carry out the duties associated with its
jurisdiction over transportation of interstate gas.3 2 The standard by
which curtailment plans are to be evaluated, the Court said, is section
4(b) of the Natural Gas Act.3 3
Its power to regulate curtailment thus established, the Commission

proceeded to formulate a policy, announced in Order No. 467, of favoring curtailment plans based on end use rather than on contractual entitlements.' The major premise behind Order No. 467 (and behind all
Additionally, the court ordered the Commission to consider the inclusion of a compensation
feature in the permanent plan. Id. Despite the Commission's contention to the contrary, the court
expressly held that the Commission does have the power to order, as part of a curtailment plan,
that those customers whose services are curtailed less than the system-wide average compensate
those whose services are curtailed more than the system-wide average. Id. at 1015-17.
29. 45 F.P.C. 570 (1971).
30. 406 U.S. 621 (1972).
31. Id. at 636-41.
32. Id. at 642.
33. Id. at 642-43. FPC v.Louisiana Power & Light Co. also included a discussion of the
procedures available to the Commission for implementing curtailment plans. Id. at 643-45. As
the Court pointed out, the Commission could have chosen to proceed in accordance with § 5(a) of
the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1976), which authorizes the Commission to establish on
its own initiative "the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice or
contract to be thereafter observed and in force," after the Commission has held a hearing and has
determined that the existing rate, charge, classification, etc. is "unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential." Since hearings can be lengthy, the use of § 5(a) for curtailment
proceedings can be cumbersome. Consequently, the Court approved the FPC's decision to proceed under § 4(c)-(e) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(c)-(e) (1976). Under § 4, a pipeline submits its
own curtailment plan which can be accepted immediately or suspended for as long as five months
pending hearings. The burden of proving the reasonableness and fairness of the plan is on the
pipeline. See M. WILLIUCH, supra note I, at 49-54.
34. 38 Fed. Reg. 1503 (1973) (partially codified as amended at 18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1977)). Order No. 467-A, 38 Fed. Reg. 2170 (1973) (partially codified as amended at 18 C.F.R. § 2.78
(1972)), added to Order No. 467 a paragraph directing pipelines to include in their curtailment
plans provisions under which pipelines could "respond to emergency situations (including environmental emergencies) during periods of curtailment where supplemental deliveries are required
to forestall irreparable injury to life or property." Id. Order No. 467-B, 38 Fed. Reg. 6384 (1973)
(partially codified as amended at 18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1977)), amended the list of priority classifications set forth in Order 467. Order No. 467-C, 39 Fed. Reg. 12984 (1974) (partially codified at 18
C.F.R. § 2.78 (1977)), added a section setting forth the minimal information required in a petition
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end-use curtailment plans) is that in times of shortage the supply of gas
should be allocated according to a hierarchy of priorities." The priorities set forth in Order 467 represent the Commission's attempt to ensure the safety of residential and small commercial customers and to
prevent gas from being put to inefficient uses or 3to6 uses for which alternate fuels could be substituted relatively easily.
Not long after the promulgation of Order No. 467 the FPC indicated a further preference for "fixed-base periods" over "rolling-base
for relief from curtailment. Unless otherwise indicated, all of the above orders will hereinafter be
referred to collectively as Order No. 467.
The priority categories set forth in Order No. 467-B were:
(1) Residential, small commercial (less than 50 Mcf on a peak day).
(2) Large commercial requirements (50 Mcf or more on a peak day), firm industrial
requirements for plant protection, feedstock and process needs, and pipeline customer
storage injection requirements.
(3) All industrial requirements not specified in paragraph (a) (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), or
(9) of this section.
(4) Firm industrial requirements for boiler fuel use at less than 3,000 Mcf per day, but
more than 1,500 Mcf per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such
requirements.
(5) Firm industrial requirements for large volume (3,000 Mcf or more per day) boiler
fuel use where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(6) Interruptible requirements of more than 300 Mcf per day, but less than 1,500 Mcf
per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(7) Interruptible requirements of intermediate volumes (from 1,500 Mcf per day
through 3,000 Mcf per day), where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such
requirements.
(8) Interruptible requirements of more than 3,000 Mcf per day, but less than 10,000
Mcf per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(9) Interruptible requirements of more than 10,000 Mcf per day, where alternate fuel
capabilities can meet such requirements.
Order No. 467-B, 38 Fed. Reg. 6384, 6386 (1973).
"Firm" service is "[s]ervice from schedules or contracts under which seller is expressly obligated to deliver specific volumes within a given time period and which anticipates no interruptions, but which may permit unexpected interruption in case the supply to higher priority
customers is threatened." 18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1977). "Interruptible" service is "[s]ervice from
schedules or contracts under which seller is not expressly obligated to deliver specific volumes
within a given time period, and which anticipates and permits interruption on short notice, or
service under schedules or contracts which expressly or impliedly require installation of alternate
fuel capability." Id.
The curtailment plan prescribed by Opinion 778 did not distinguish between firm and interruptible service. 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1189, 5-1091.
35. "We are impelled to direct curtailment on the basis of end use rather than on the
basis of contract simply because contracts do not necessarily serve the public interest
requirement ofefficient allocation of this wasting resource. In time of shortage, performance of a firm contract to deliver gas for an inferior use, at the expense of reduced deliveries for priority uses, is not compatible with consumer protection."
Order No. 467, 38 Fed. Reg. 1503 (1973) (quoting Arkansas La. Gas. Co. 49 F.P.C. 53 (1973),
remandedforfurtherconsideration sub. nonL Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 517 F.2d 1223
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976)).
36. For list of priorities, see note 34 supra.
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periods." 37 A plan that uses a fixed-base period allocates gas according
to each distributor's end-use proffle during a fixed historical period,
whereas a plan using a rolling-base period allocates gas according to
data that is periodically updated to reflect changes in the distributor's
end-use profile.

Although the employment of end-use principles in curtailment
plans has received favorable judicial response,38 courts have refused to
allow the Commission automatically to apply the priorities set forth in
Order No. 467 to individual pipelines. Instead, courts have required
the Commission to demonstrate in each curtailment proceeding the

reasons why the priorities set forth in Order No. 467 should be applied
to the particular pipeline under consideration. In Arkansas Power &
Light Co. v. FPC,9 for example, the court rejected the Commission's

decision to place firm service in a higher priority category than interruptible service. 4° Although Order No. 467 embodied the distinction

between firm and interruptible service, 4 1 the court disapproved the employment of the distinction where the validity of its application to the

curtailment plan under consideration was not supported by substantial
evidence in the record.4 2
In ConsolidatedEdison Co. v. FPC(Con Ed ), 43 a case which foreshadowed the decision in North Carolina v. FERC, the same court of
37. El Paso Natural Gas Co., Opinion No. 697, 1 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) 5-164 (1974); see
Muys, FederalPower Commission Alocation ofNaturalGas Supply Shortages:Prorationing,Priorities and Perplexity, 20 ROCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 301, 333 (1975).
38. See American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 882 (1974).
39. 517 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
40. Id. at 1233.
41. See note 34 supra.
42. 517 F.2d at 1233. Similarly, in American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925, 94546 (D.C. Cir.), cert.denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974), the court refused to accept the unsupported proposition that "boiler fuel uses of natural gas are per se inferior to all other uses, for purposes of
curtailment, regardless of the particular circumstances." Accordingly, the court remanded the
case so that the Commission could state its reasons for assigning boiler fuel use on thisparticular
pioeline to the lowest priority categories. Id. American Smelting and Arkansas Power are consistent with the holding in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that Order
No. 467 is a general statement of policy-not a binding rule--and that it is not a replacement for
the process of pipeline-by-pipeline adjudication of curtailment plans. See M. WILLRICH, supra
note I, at 88-92, 105 n.51.
Order No. 467 has strongly influenced curtailment plans, however. Technically, pipelines are
free to file curtailment plans that do not conform to Order No. 467. Id. at 90. By expressing a
strong preference for plans modeled after Order No. 467, though, the Commission has exerted
considerable pressure on the pipelines to file conforming plans. Id Furthermore, the threat of
liability for breach of contract with their customers may be an incentive for pipelines to file plans
consistent with Order No. 467, since "Commission approval of necessary curtailments is an effective barrier to liability where the pipeline was not in some way responsible for the shortage." Id.
43. 511 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
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appeals imposed on the Transco system a temporary negotiated settlement agreement instead of a plan modeled on Order 467." The court
gave as one of its reasons: "the 467 plan does not take into account the
fact that some customers are totally dependent on Transco while others
purchase substantial quantities from pipelines supplying a much higher
percentage of contract demand. '45 The opinion in Con EdI thus curpartial/full requirements issue central to North Carosorily raised the
46
lina v. FERC.
Except for Con Ed I, most of the cases47 criticizing the Commission's curtailment policy directed their criticism primarily at the FPC's
choice of certain end-use priorities for the particular pipeline under
consideration. North Carolina v. FERC, however, cast doubt on the
whole of the Commission's curtailment policy by demonstrating that
the end-use plans approved by the Commission are likely to fail to accomplish their purpose: the protection of high-priority users ahead of
low-priority users.4 8 Since the opinion questions the legality of any
end-use plan that does not achieve results consistent with end-use theory,49 North Carolinav. FERC will no doubt require the Commission
to engage in a thorough reevaluation of its curtailment policy. Two
well-established features of that policy-the use of fixed-base periods
and the disregard of the partial/full requirements phenomenon-are
now particularly suspect, since the court determined that these features,
are very likely to produce rewhen incorporated into an end-use plan,
50
sults inconsistent with end-use theory.
As the court observed in North Carolina v. FERC, the vice inherent in a plan that employs a fixed-base period is easily perceived. 51 The
achievement of true end-use allocation in 1978 is highly unlikely if gas
is allocated, as required by Opinion 778, according to data from 197244. Id. at 381.
45. Id. at 380.
46. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 512 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Con Ed I1), the
court reinforced, indirectly, its earlier criticism of the Commission's failure to take into account
the partial/full requirements phenomenon. Citing that portion of Con Ed! in which it had raised
the partial/full requirements issue, the court stated that before a 467-type plan went into effect on
the Transco system, the Commission should consider the problems raised in recent judicial evaluation of the application of 467 priorities to individual problems. Id. at 1347 & n.90.
47. E.g., Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 517 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cen. denied,
424 U.S. 933 (1976); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974); American
Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir.), cert.denied,419 U.S. 882 (1974); see notes
38-42 and accompanying text supra.
48. 584 F.2d at 1012-14.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1012.
51. Id.
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1973.52 Since each distributor's mix of end uses has probably changed
in the past six years, the use of such a distant fixed-base period would
assessment of the curconstitute a serious impediment to an accurate
53
adoption.
at
impact
actual
plan's
tailment
The significance of North Carolina v. FERC's criticism of fixedbase periods lies not in the court's express statements on the subject,
but in the implications of its reasoning. The court expressly stated that
plans using fixed-base periods are not illegal per se.54 Furthermore, the
court did not order the Commission to employ rolling-base periods in
its end-use plans. Instead, the court required the Commission simply
to collect and examine relatively current end-use data." In explaining
the reason why this current data must be made available, though, the
court implied that, while plans using fixed-base periods were not illegal
per se, most such curtailment plans would indeed be found illegal. The
Commission must have relatively current end-use data available, said
the court, so that the Commission can determine whether an end-use
plan, regardless of the type of base period it employs, would actually
produce true end-use results at the time of its adoption. 6 This determination of the plan's actual impact is necessary, in turn, for the final
determination of the plan's legality, because, the court declared, the
discrimination resulting from an end-use plan is justified only insofar
as the plan produces true end-use results.57 The implication of the
court's reasoning is that if current end-use data shows that the use of a
fixed-base period would create anti-end-use discrimination (that is, a
situation in which, contrary to the principles of end use, some of the
pipeline's customers were forced to curtail higher priority uses while
other customers of the same pipeline were still serving lower priority
uses), then the plan must be rejected, and a plan based on current enduse data, or a plan not based on end-use at all, adopted instead. Since
the ise of fixed-base periods is likely to produce results contrary to
end-use principles,58 end-use plans employing fixed-base periods are
likely to be illegal.
One loophole through which such plans might nevertheless escape
invalidation is found in the court's intimation that if other policies
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 1012-13.
Id. at 1012-13 & slip op. at 21 n.20 (as amended Aug. 29, 1978).
Slip op. at 21 n.20 (as amended Aug. 29, 1978).
Id.
Id
584 F.2d at 1012 & slip op. at 21 n.20 (as amended Aug. 29, 1978).
See 584 F.2d at 1012 & slip op. at 21 n.20.
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which the Commission seeks to further by way of a curtailment plan
outweigh the need to eliminate the discriminatory anti-end-use impact
of a plan that employs a fixed-base period, the fixed-base period may
be retained as part of the plan.59 The other or "collaterar' policies to
which the Commission wishes to accommodate its end-use plans, include "(1) encouraging conservation, (2) discouraging load growth, and
(3) stimulating supplemental supplies."60 The court offered no guidance, however, about the weight to be accorded each of these policies.
Furthermore, the court left some question about the manner in which
the "accommodation" or "balancing" process is to be carried out. Presumably, the degree of anti-end-use discrimination (determined from
59. 584 F.2d at 1014 n.27. These other policies, though, are to be considered only after the
actual impact of the plan, has been assessed. Id.
60. Id. The term "supplemental supplies" as used in Opinions 778 and 778-A refers not to
supplies of natural gas from other interstate pipelines, but to substitute supplies-liquified natural
gas (LNG), synethetic natural gas (SNG) storage, or propane-air injection-procured by local
distributors through their own efforts. Transcontinental Pipe Line Corp., Opinion No. 778-A, 11
FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) 5-177, 5-190 (1976).
The idea that a fixed-base period might further the Commission's policy of "stimulating supplemental supplies" rests on the Commission's concern that a roling-base period "would act as a
disincentive to Transco's resale customers [distributors] attaching new supplemental supplies and
as a penalty to those resale customers which have already'attached supplemental supplies." 10
FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1097. This argument is based on the assumption that, if a rollingbase period were used, some distributors would "upgrade their requirements," id., presumably by
extending service to more ultimate consumers in higher priority categories. These distributors
would then be entitled to a proportionately greater share of the pipeline's supply, even though
they had not made any efforts on their own to obtain supplemental supplies. Id. Since a proportionately smaller amount of gas would then be available to the rest of the pipeline system, those
distributors who had obtained supplemental supplies would then be forced to use those supplies to
make up the shortfall. The result, the Commission contends, would be to shift supplemental supplies from the more industrious and innovative distributors to those distributors who had made no
efforts to obtain such supplies on their own. Id.
The Commission also believes that the use of a rolling-base period, by allowing distributors
to take on more high priority consumers (thereby upgrading the distributors' requirements) without securing additional supplies from sources other than Transco, would cause the limited supply
on the Transco system to be spread over a growing number of high priority consumers. Id. The
result, the Commission fears, would be increased curtailment into high priorities and perhaps into
priority one. Id. Although persuasive when considered alone, this argument is fundamentally
inconsistent with end-use theory.
For example, the Commission has made it clear that the objective of its end-use policy is
to drive low priority industrial uses to alternative fuels. It would seem to follow that a
distribution customer ought to be able to reallocate the gas used by the low priority
industrial customers to the preferred higher priority uses. This cannot happen, however,
if future deliveries are forever locked in to the historic end-use pattern of the base period
existing before the effect of curtailment was felt.
Muys, supranote 37, at 333-34. In view of the FPC's opposition to the use of rolling-base periods,
it appears that the objective of the Commission's end-use policy is to drive lower priority industrial users to alternate fuels and to discourage distributors from reallocating the gas saved thereby.
By seeking to accomplish such multiple objectives, the Commission, as the court of appeals explained, attempts to accommodate its end-use curtailment plans to the collateral policies of encouraging conservation and discouraging load growth. 584 F.2d at 1014 n.27.
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an assessment of actual impact on ultimate consumers) resulting from a
plan with a fixed-base period is to be weighed, in each case, against the
potential benefit to collateral policies from the use of the same plan.
Language in the opinion,61 however, suggests that rather than permitting a plan's anti-end-use discrimination to be justified in some instances by collateral policies, the court would not allow such
discrimination to be so justified if the collateral policies sought to be
effectuated by the plan could be carried out by a nondiscriminatory
plan. If this language is controlling, then the balancing of collateral
policies against anti-end-use discrimination never comes into play.62
This closes the loophole of collateral policies and makes it all the more
unlikely that end-use plans incorporating discriminatory features (such
as fixed-base periods) would survive judicial scrutiny.
Prior to North Carolina v. FERC,and except for brief mention in
Con Ed 1,63 the issue whether the Commission should take into account post-base period changes in the relative levels of curtailment on
other pipelines in order to avoid the partial/full requirements phenomenon had been given little judicial consideration. The issue arose in
North Carolina v. FERC because North Carolina customers (full-requirements customers) are served only by Transco, a pipeline that has
encountered very severe shortages since the 1972-1973 base period.
Most of Transco's other customers (partial-requirements customers), in
contrast, are served by one or more other pipelines that have experienced shortages of far less severity in the last several years than has
Transco. 6' As the court found, a plan for one pipeline that does not
take into account post-base period changes" in the relative levels of
61. "The practical effect of the Commission's actions is to convert what it has labeled an
'end-use' plan into a conservation, supply-incentive plan; hence, the discriminatory end-use fea-

tures of the plan become arbitrary because the conservation, supply-incentive policies can be
achieved through a non-discriminatory plan." 584 F.2d at 1014 n.27.

62. This analysis was suggested in Letter from Jeffrey L. Harrison, Associate Professor, Bates
College of Law, The University of Houston, to Christopher Moore (Sept. 19, 1978) (copy on file in
office of North CarolinaLaw Review).
63. See text accompanying notes 43-50 supra.
64. 584 F.2d at 1013-14.

There are a number of reasons for the wide disparity in curtailments between pipe-

lines. The primary source of supply of interstate gas is the long-term contracts between

pipeline companies and natural gas producers for gas in a particular field ....

The

pipeline companies with serious curtailments today did not sign contracts for extra
reserves in the 1960's, did not vertically integrate into offshore production, and were

unlucky enough to have substantial contracts with producers in fields that were exhausted at an unexpectedly early date.

Harrison & Formby, supra note 1, at 82-83 (footnotes omitted).
65. Only the relative levels of curtailment on different pipelines in theyears since the 19721973 baseperiodare in issue. The amounts of gas supplied to each partial-requirements customer
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curtailment on other pipelines serving the pipeline's partial-requirements customers can have the result of forcing its full-requirements
customers to curtail into high priorities, while partial-requirements customers are still serving lower priorities.6 6 Such a result is obviously
contrary to the principles of end-use curtailment.67
The impact the court's decision will have on the partial/full requirements issue is only implicit in the court's reasoning. The court
claimed that it was not requiring that the Commission "actually
allocate supplies to partial-requirements customers in relation to the
levels of curtailment on alternative pipelines," but was merely directing
the Commission to consider the partial/full requirements phenomenon
in order to assess the actual impact of the plan.68 The implication of
the court's reasoning, however, is that if an allocation plan that does
not account for curtailment on other pipelines causes discrimination
among members of the same class of end-users, then the plan will be
declared invalid. Nevertheless, the court suggested that the discrimination resulting from disregard of the partial/full requirements phenomenon might be justified in some cases by the same collateral policies that
might also justify the use of fixed-base periods. 69 As with the base peby each of its supplier-pipelines duringthe baseperiodwere taken into account in the Opinion 778
plan. See 584 F.2d at 1010.
66. Id. at 1013-14.
67. The anti-end-use vice inherent in the Commission's failure to take account of the
fact that some of Transco's customers are served by more than one pipeline can be illustrated by the following hypothetical. Company A and Company B have identical requirements by priority. If Company A obtained half of its gas from Transco during the
1972-1973 base period and half from Pipeline X, Transco would be assigned half of each
of Company A's priorities. If Transco curtailed at 40% and Pipeline X at 20%, Company
A's curtailment would be 30% of its total supply. If Company B were supplied entirely
by Transco, it would be curtailed 40%. If the priority 1 and 2 requirements to each were
65% of its total requirements, Company A would be able to supply all of its priority 1
and 2 needs and have 5% of its total supply available for lower priorities. Company B,
on the other hand, would have to curtail its priority 2 market by 5% of its total supply
(which may be substantially more than 5%ofjust its priority 2 market). The effect then
is that Company B must curtail a portion of its priority 2 market in order that Company
A can sell inexpensive pipeline gas to its priority 3 market. Clearly in such a situation
the whole concept of protecting high priority end users is violated.
d.
68. Id. at 1014 n.22.
69. Id. at 1014 n.27. For a list of collateral policies, see text accompanying note 60 supra.
Thus, although a plan might create discrimination because it does not allocate gas to a pipeline's
partial-requirements customers in accordance with the relative levels of curtailment on alternate
pipelines, such a plan might still be valid, if the resulting discrimination were outweighed by
collateral policies (encouraging conservation, attachment of supplemental supplies, and discouraging load growth).
The court's suggestion that the Commission sought to justify its failure to take into account
supplies from other pipelines by invoking collateral policies, 584 F.2d at 1014 n.27, is somewhat
misleading. The Commission had these policies in mind when it decided not to use a rolling-base
period, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., Opinion No. 778, 10 FaD. POWER SERV. (M-B) at

1979]

SNATURA4L GAS REGUL4 TION

riod issue, however, there remains some uncertainty about the weight
that these collateral policies are to be accorded when balanced against

the discrimination resulting from a plan that fails to consider levels of
curtailment on other pipelines.70
Conspicuously absent from the opinion is any discussion of the
"inter-pipeline supply allocation" that may result from a curtailment
plan that allocates a particular pipeline's gas to its partial-requirements
customers in relation to the levels of curtailment on other pipelines
serving those customers. 7 ' There is a question whether the Commission has the authority, in the context of a single adjudicatory proceeding directly involving only one pipeline, to order into effect a
72
curtailment plan when inter-pipeline supply allocation results. The

Commission contends that a partial/full requirements adjustment on
the Transco system would have a highly complex impact on the alloca-

tion of the supplies of other pipelines that serve Transco's partial-requirements customers.7 3 Furthermore, the Commission maintains,

such an adjustment would effectively shift gas from those other pipeline
systems to the Transco system,74 and since those pipelines are not parties to the Transco proceeding, would deprive them of their due process

rights.75 Accordingly, the Commission decided that the proper vehicle
for consideration of the partial/full requirements phenomenon is not a
proceeding for curtailment on a single pipeline, but rather a general
rulemaking proceeding.

A proceeding directly involving only one pipeline is an appropri5-1097, and when it decided not to take into account supplemental supplies attached since the base
period. Id. at 5-1093. Furthermore, the Commission did discuss both the supplemental supplies
issue and the partial/full requirements issue in Opinion 778. Id. Careful analysis of the opinion
at id., however, demonstrates that the Commission's primary reason for its decision on the partial/full requirements issue was not its desire to promote the collateral policies noted above.
Opinion 778-A, I1 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) 5-177 (1976), and the Commission's brief in North
Carolinav. FERCsupport the same conclusion. Instead, the Commission argued that to allocate
gas to Transco's partial-requirements customers according to post-base period changes in the relative supplies of other pipelines would constitute illegal inter-pipeline supply allocation. 10 FED.
POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1093; see text accompanying notes 71-81 infra.
70. For base period issue, see text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
71. This lacuna in the decision is puzzling in light of the considerable attention given the
issue in Opinion 778, see 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1093, and Opinion 778-A, see 11 FED.
POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-190, and in the briefs of several of the parties, see, eg., Brief for Respondent Federal Power Commission at 25-29; Initial Brief for Petitioner Piedmont Natural Gas Co. at
34-37; Joint Brief for Intervenors Brooklyn Union Gas Co., North Penn Gas Co., Pennsylvania
Gas and Water Co., Public Service Electric and Gas Co., Washington Gas Light Co. at 24-28.
72. See 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1093.
73. 11 FE. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-190.
74. Id.
75. See 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1093.
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ate forum for the consideration of the partial/full requirements phenomenon if one accepts the view that a partial/full requirements
adjustment does not constitute inter-pipeline supply allocation, but affects only the allocation of that single pipeline's gas among its customers. 6 This view is easily supportable on the basis that a partial/full
requirements adjustment does not involve any physical interconnection
between pipelines. 7" The Commission claims, however, that other
pipelines are affected by such plans through the process of "displacement.""8 According to the Commission's argument, taking into account the partial/full requirements phenomenon in formulating
Transco's curtailment plan would have negative effects on other pipeline systems through a two-stage process. First, although discrimination against the full-requirements customers on the Transco system
would be eliminated, discrimination against Transco's partial-requirements customers, "vis-a-vis their fellow customers of the other pipeline
supplier," would result.7 9 A partial/full requirements adjustment

would cause the proportionate supply of Transco's gas available to
Transco's partial-requirements customers to decrease as the supplies to
full-requirements customers were increased. Given a constant level of
supply from their other pipeline sources, Transco's partial-requirements customers would then have a total supply of gas lower than the
total available before the adjustment of the Transco system, causing
them to curtail into higher priorities than before the adjustment. Since
other multi-pipeline customers who are not served by Transco would
be receiving an amount of gas unaffected by the adjustment on the
Transco system, the result would be discrimination against Transco's
partial-requirements customers in comparison to their fellow customers
on non-Transco systems.
The second effect of a partial/full requirements adjustment which
the Commission contends involves inter-pipeline supply allocation, occurs as follows. If other pipelines attempted to eliminate the discrimination against Transco's partial-requirements customers by "reducing
their deliveries systemwide so as to increase deliveries to the partial
requirements customers affected by Transco's full/partial requirements
adjustment," the result would be inter-pipeline supply allocation by
displacement."0 The effect, according to the Commission, is to shift gas
76. See Initial Brief for Petitioner Piedmont Natural Gas Co. at 35.
77. Id.
78. 11 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-190.

79. Brief for Respondent Federal Power Commission at 27.
80. Id.
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from other pipelines to the Transco system without according the other
pipelines their due process rights.81
Even if the due process problem can be solved by a general
rulemaking procedure in which all affected parties are represented,
there remains the question whether the Natural Gas Act8 2 grants the
Commission the requisite authority to order into effect curtailment
plans that result in indirect inter-pipeline supply allocation.83 Such
plans might violate section 7(a) of the Natural Gas Act,84 which provides that "the Commission shall have no authority.. . to compel
such natural-gas company to establish physical connection or sell natural gas when to do so would impair its ability to render adequate service to its customers." Whether the indirect inter-pipeline supply
allocation anticipated by the Commission would violate section 7(a)
would depend on whether such allocation were deemed to constitute
"physical connection," and on the reviewing court's definition of "ade85
quate service."
Implicit in the court of appeals' failure to discuss the issue of interpipeline supply allocation could be a conclusion that allocation to partial-requirements customers according to the levels of curtailment on
alternate pipelines simply does not constitute inter-pipeline supply allocation. 6 Or, the absence of discussion of the issue might be read to
imply that the due process problems anticipated by the Commission are
nonexistent, and that the Commission does in fact have the authority to
order indirect inter-pipeline supply allocation. It is more likely,
though, that the court's reticence on the issue. of inter-pipeline supply
allocation is a product of the court's decision to restrict the scope of its
opinion. The express holding in North Carolinav. FERC is limited to a
requirement that the Commission "first, determine, and, second,
81. See 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1093. Contrary to the Commission's argument, the
real effect of a partial/full requirements adjustment does not appear to be a shift of gas to Transco

from other pipelines. The other pipelines continue to transport and sell the same amount of gas as
before the adjustment. The real shift seems to be from the customers of the other pipelines that
serve Transco's partial-requirements customers to Transco's full-requirements customers. The
parties whose due process rights are denied, then, are those customers who are not served by
Transco, but who are served by other pipelines that serve Transco's partial-requirements
customers.

82.
83.
sylvania
25-26 &

15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976).
See Joint Brief for Intervenors Brooklyn Union Gas Co., North Penn Gas Co., PennGas and Water Co., Public Service Electric and Gas Co., Washington Gas Light Co. at
26 n.14.

84. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(a) (1976); see M. WILLRICH, supra note 1, at 48.
85. See M. WuLRICH, supra note 1, at 48.

86. The court could have followed the reasoning in text accompanying notes 76 & 77 supra.
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consider the impact of its opinion on ultimate users in the implementation of a curtailment plan for the Transco system."87 The court did not
actually order the Commission to allocate gas to partial-requirements
customers in relation to the levels of curtailment on alternate pipelines;
it was therefore technically unnecessary to consider the issue of interpipeline supply allocation and the potential problems associated therewith. Nevertheless, the court should have considered the issue since the
natural implication of the court's reasoning is indeed that (absent the
influence of a sufficiently strong collateral policy) the Commission
should in fact allocate gas according to the relative levels of curtailment
on other pipelines.
North Carolina v. FERC constitutes long-awaited recognition that
the Commission's application of end-use theory does not always produce results consistent with end-use principles. In requiring the Commission to consider the actual impact of end-use plans at the time of
their adoption, 8 and in declaring that the discrimination resulting
from end-use plans is justified only to the extent that such plans actually protect high priority users from curtailment ahead of lower priority
users, 8 9 the court made significant progress toward reducing existing
regional distortions in the allocation of natural gas supplies. The
court's opinion suffers, however, from a lack of clarity in its discussion
of the possibility that certain collateral policies might justify the discrimination resulting from end-use plans. 90 Furthermore, the court ignored the potential legal infirmities of a plan that allocates gas to
partial-requirements customers according to the relative levels of curtailment on other pipelines. The questions whether such a plan would
violate the due process rights of indirectly affected pipelines and
whether the Commission would have the authority under the Natural
Gas Act to adopt such a plan will no doubt arise in the process of interpreting and applying the opinion. By failing to discuss these issues, the
court contributed uncertainty to future curtailment proceedings.
Although it leaves a number of issues unresolved, North Carolina
v. FERC serves the useful function of illustrating the problems that
inevitably result from the allocation of natural gas on a pipeline-bypipeline basis. Even if each pipeline's gas were allocated in such a way
as to eliminate the discrimination resulting from the partial/full re87. 584 F.2d at 1015 (emphasis in original).
88. Slip op. at 21 n.20 (as amended Aug. 29, 1978).
89. 584 F.2d at 1012.

90. See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra.
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quirements phenomenon, the vastly different levels of supply on different pipelines would preclude the achievement of true end-use results.9 '
Only if the Commission can allocate gas on a nationwide inter-pipeline
basis can it prevent lower priority users from being served in some areas while higher priority users -are being curtailed elsewhere. Allocation on a nationwide basis would, of course, require physical

interconnection between pipelines, which would in turn require reform
of the Natural Gas Act. 92 Achievement of true end-use results would
also require federal regulation of local distributors, since under present
law the states are free to ignore end-use policy in regulating the allocation of gas from local distributors to ultimate consumers. 93 Finally,
Congress could choose to deregulate the field price of all natural gas in
91. See Harrison & Formby, supra note 1, at 79-86.
92. M. WILRICH, supra note 1, at 233-34.
The Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-2, §§ 3-4, 91 Stat. 4, authorized the
President to order transfers of gas between interstate pipelines when necessary to protect the supplies of high-priority uses of natural gas. Section 2 of the Act defined "high-priority use" as:
(A) use of natural gas in a residence;
(B) use of natural gas in a commercial establishment in amounts of less than 50
Mcf on a peak day; or
(C) any other use of natural gas the termination of which the President determines
would endanger life, health, or maintenance of physical property.
Section 4(a)(l)(C), however, provided that the President's power to order inter-pipeline deliveries
expired on April 30, 1977.
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350,printedin [19781 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws No. 12, was passed by the Senate on September 27, 1978, 124 CONG.
REc.S16,265 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978) and by the House on October 14, 1978, 124 CONG. REC.
H13,427 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978). The Act confers on the President emergency powers essentially
like those granted by the Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977. Title III of the Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978 authorizes the President to declare a natural gas emergency when service to high
priority uses is threatened, and, subject to certain conditions, to allocate gas on a nationwide basis
during such an emergency. Unlike the 1977 Act, the 1978 Act does not set a particular date
beyond which the President would no longer have power to declare a natural gas emergency.
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 also provides for certain new priorities to be followed in
curtailment proceedings. Title IV of the Act ranks "essential industrial process and feedstock
uses" ahead of all other uses except "essential agricultural uses" and "high-priority uses." Essential agricultural uses are to be protected ahead of all other uses except high-priority uses. Essential
agricultural use is defined in § 401(f)(1) as
any use of natural gas--(A) for agricultural production, natural fiber production, natural
fiber processing, food processing, food quality maintenance, irrigation pumping, crop
drying, or (B) as a process fuel or feedstock in the production of fertilizer, agricultural
chemicals, animal feed, or food, which the Secretary of Agriculture determines is necessary for full food and fiber production.
High-priority user is defined by § 401(t)(2) as "any person who-(A) uses natural gas in a residence; (B) uses natural gas in a commercial establishment in amounts of less than 50 Mcf on a
peak day; (C) uses natural gas in any school, hospital, or similar institution; or (D) uses natural
gas in any other use the curtailment of which the Secretary of Energy determines would endanger
life, health, or maintenance of physical property." Finally, § 402(d)(1) defines essential industrial
process or feedstock use as "any use of natural gas in an industrial process or as a feedstock which
the Secretary [of Energy] determines is essential."
93. See M. WILLRICH, supra note 1, at 233-34, 275-76.
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hopes of increasing supplies and thereby reducing the need for regulation of curtailment. 4 Even if deregulation of prices were to increase
supplies dramatically, however, shortages would most likely remain
sufficiently serious to require some form of regulation over curtailment. 5 While it is difficult to predict with any accuracy the future
form that natural gas allocation will take, North Carolina v. FERC
demonstrates that future end-use curtailment plans will be subjected to
close judicial scrutiny designed to ensure that such plans produce true
end-use results.
CHRISTOPHER WHITMAN MOORE

Attorney-Client Privilege-Diersfled Industries,Inc. v.
Meredith: New Rules for Applying the Privilege When the
Client Is a Corporation
The attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure confidential
communications between an attorney and his client.' The privilege applies in both individual and corporate client contexts; when the client is
a corporation, however, application of the privilege may prove more
complex than when the client is an individual. Two questions must be
answered in determining the applicability of the privilege in the corporate client context: first, what types of activity constitute legal services
by the attorney and, second, which employees of a corporation may be
2
deemed to so represent the corporation as to be the corporate client.
In Diversifted Industries,Inc. v. Meredith,3 the United States Court of
94. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, does not deregulate prices on all natural gas, but

"gradually ends controls on the price of newly discovered gas until the price ceiling is lifted in
1985." 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2615-16 (1978); see note 5 supra.
95. See M. WILLRICH, supra note 1,at 13-14.

I. A number of criteria must be satisfied in order for the attorney-client privilege to apply.
"(1) Were legal advice of any kind is sought (2)from aprofessionallegaladvisor in his capaciy es
such, (3) the communications relating to thatpurpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6)
are at his instance permanentlyprotected (7) from disclosure ...
(8) except the protection be
waived." 8 J. WIOMoRE,EVIDENCE § 2291 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
2. See, e.g., Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546
(D.D.C. 1970); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
3. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978).

